Candidate arguments for counsel, ranked strongest-first — brainstorming inputs for counsel to evaluate, not a drafted response.
1Unsupported 'well-understood, routine, conventional' findings — Berkheimer evidentiary gap (Step 2B)
Eligibility rebuttalClaim 6Claim 7Claim 8Claim 13Claim 20Rebuts: §101 rejection of claims 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20
obtain an input ... cause transmission of the input (claim 6); generate a cryptographic attestation of a routing decision ... maintain the cryptographic attestation in a distributed ledger (claim 7); store the input signature and each accessed agent signature in a persistent memory structure (claim 8)
For counsel to weigh: at Step 2B the examiner concludes the additional elements are 'well-understood, routine, and conventional,' supporting that conclusion only with MPEP § 2106.05(d)(II) citations and generic case categories ('receiving or transmitting data over a network,' 'storing and retrieving information in memory'). Under Berkheimer v. HP and MPEP § 2106.05(d)(I), a finding that an element is well-understood, routine, and conventional must be supported by one of the recognized evidentiary showings (a citation demonstrating the element is widely prevalent, an express applicant admission, a court holding on that element, or a § 1.132-type factual basis). Counsel may press that the office action supplies no such factual support for the more specific additional elements — notably claim 7's 'cryptographic attestation of a routing decision' 'maintain[ed] ... in a distributed ledger' and claim 8's 'persistent memory structure' — leaving the conventionality conclusion unsupported for those elements. This is an evidentiary defect counsel can raise without conceding the abstract-idea characterization.
- —Office action (claim 6, Step 2B): 'The courts have found limitations directed to obtaining information electronically, recited at a high level of generality, to be well-understood, routine, and conventional (see MPEP 2106.05(d)(II)...)'
- —Office action (claim 7): treats 'maintain the cryptographic attestation in a distributed ledger' as extra-solution activity and 'generate a cryptographic attestation of a routing decision' as adding the words 'apply it,' without any evidentiary support for conventionality
- —Claim 7: 'generate a cryptographic attestation of a routing decision that identifies the at least one AI agent of the selected AI agent set; and maintain the cryptographic attestation in a distributed ledger.'
MPEP § 2106.05(d) (I) — Berkheimer: a 'well-understood, routine, conventional' finding must be evidentiarily supported
Risk The examiner may cure the gap on the next action by adding a Berkheimer citation or expressly designating the distributed-ledger/persistent-memory elements as notoriously well-known, so this argument may be temporary. It also does not by itself defeat the Step 2A abstract-idea finding, so counsel should pair it with a Prong Two practical-application position.
Likely examiner response✓ survives — strong
An examiner's cleanest response is to CURE rather than dispute — supplement the § 2106.05(d) finding with a Berkheimer-compliant showing (a documentary citation or, where available, Official Notice) that distributed ledgers, cryptographic attestations, and persistent memory structures are widely prevalent, and reissue the conventionality finding with support. The examiner can also argue that these elements were addressed at Step 2A Prong Two as extra-solution / mere-output activity, so their conventionality at Step 2B is not the sole load-bearing basis for the rejection and the outcome does not turn on the evidentiary gap.
How to adjust This is a procedural/evidentiary defect that is difficult for the examiner to wave away without actually adding evidence, and it can be raised without conceding the abstract-idea characterization (per MPEP § 2106.05(d)(I) / Berkheimer). For counsel to weigh: it likely forces supplementation rather than allowance, so treat it as a pressure lever and a record-building step, not a dispositive win; pair it with the Prong Two arguments (2 and 4) directed at the same claim 7/8 elements so that if the examiner supplies evidence at 2B, the integration challenge at 2A remains live.
2Hashing, LSH, and bitwise-distance steps are not practically performable in the human mind (Step 2A Prong 1)
Eligibility rebuttalClaim 6Claim 9Claim 12Claim 13Rebuts: §101 rejection of claims 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20
determining an input signature by applying one or more hash functions to the feature set (claim 6); perform a bitwise operation between the input signature and an agent signature to determine a distance value (claim 9); wherein the one or more hash functions comprise locality-sensitive hash functions (claim 12)
For counsel to weigh: the examiner's Step 2A Prong One characterization equates applying hash functions to the mental act of a human determining 'a distinct identifier for each and every AI agent' (office action, claim 6 Prong One analysis). That characterization is contestable under MPEP § 2106.04(a)(2)(III), which limits the mental-process grouping to concepts that can PRACTICALLY be performed in the human mind. Claim 9 requires 'perform a bitwise operation between the input signature and an agent signature to determine a distance value,' and claim 12 narrows the hash functions to 'locality-sensitive hash functions' — operations that a person cannot realistically carry out with pencil and paper on the feature-set data at issue. Counsel may argue the examiner recharacterized a specific computational operation as an abstract 'identifier' comparison and thereby understated what the claim actually requires, so the mental-process finding does not fit the limitations as claimed.
- —Office action (claim 6, Step 2A Prong One): 'For example, a human can determine a distinct identifier for each and every AI agent.'
- —Claim 9: 'perform a bitwise operation between the input signature and an agent signature to determine a distance value'
- —Claim 12: 'wherein the one or more hash functions comprise locality-sensitive hash functions'
MPEP § 2106.04(a)(2) — mental-process grouping is limited to concepts that can practically be performed in the human mind; see also the 2019 PEG mental-steps analysis
Risk The examiner may reply that a hash is merely a rule that could be executed by hand for small inputs and that the claim recites the function at a high level of generality without tying it to a specific unmind-able computation. Prosecution-history caution: emphasizing that the operations require machine computation should avoid conceding that any hardware performing the operation is merely 'generic,' which could undercut a later Step 2B inventive-concept position.
Likely examiner response◐ survives — moderate
An examiner can sidestep the 'not practically performable in the mind' point by relocating the limitation to a DIFFERENT judicial-exception grouping rather than defending the mental-process label. Under MPEP § 2106.04(a)(2), applying hash functions to a feature set and computing a distance value are readily characterized as a MATHEMATICAL CONCEPT (mathematical relationships/calculations), for which mind-performability is not the test at all — so the argument that LSH/bitwise operations exceed pencil-and-paper capacity does not rescue the claim from Step 2A Prong One. The examiner can further note that claim 6 recites only 'one or more hash functions' at a generic level (claim 12's LSH and claim 9's bitwise distance are narrowing dependents), so under BRI the broad independent recitation reaches simple hashing/comparison that maps comfortably onto a data-comparison abstraction.
How to adjust Strongest as to claims 9 and 12 (bitwise distance, locality-sensitive hashing), weakest as to the generic 'one or more hash functions' of claim 6. For counsel to weigh: pre-empt the math-concept pivot by directing the argument at whether the specific ordered operation is recited at a level that is a mathematical relationship in itself vs. a step within a larger technical process — and consider pairing with argument 2 (Prong Two) so the argument does not rise or fall solely on the grouping label. If the only viable footing is claims 9/12, consider whether importing those narrowing features into the independent claim by amendment better protects scope than arguing them as dependents.
3Claim 7 cryptographic-attestation / distributed-ledger elements as more than field-of-use linkage (Step 2A Prong 2)
Eligibility rebuttalClaim 7Claim 20Rebuts: §101 rejection of claims 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20
Strategy check: re-ranked from #4 — For claim 20 the Berkheimer target (persistent storage) is expressly recited as conventional in the MPEP, so the Prong Two routing-path argument is the stronger claim-20-specific hook and should outrank the Step 2B storage argument here.
generate a cryptographic attestation of a routing decision that identifies the at least one AI agent of the selected AI agent set; and maintain the cryptographic attestation in a distributed ledger (claim 7)
For counsel to weigh: the office action treats claim 7's attestation generation as merely 'apply it' plus 'mere data output' and its distributed-ledger maintenance as extra-solution activity plus a generic computer component. Counsel may argue that generating a cryptographic attestation of the routing decision and committing it to a distributed ledger imposes a concrete, tamper-evident recordkeeping constraint on the routing output that goes beyond generally linking the exception to a field of use, and may weigh whether this qualifies as a meaningful additional element under MPEP § 2106.05(a)/(e) rather than insignificant post-solution output under § 2106.05(g). This is a Prong Two argument specific to the dependent claim that can survive even if the independent-claim Prong Two challenge is contested.
- —Office action (claim 7, Step 2A Prong Two): 'these limitations also amount to extra solution activity because it is a mere nominal or tangential addition to the claim, amounting to mere data output (see MPEP 2106.05(g)).'
- —Claim 7: 'maintain the cryptographic attestation in a distributed ledger.'
MPEP § 2106.05(e)/(a) — additional elements adding a meaningful limitation; contrast with § 2106.05(g) insignificant extra-solution activityEvidence needed: Confirm the as-filed specification describes a technical purpose/effect for the cryptographic attestation and distributed-ledger recording, to support treating them as meaningful rather than nominal.
Risk The examiner will likely maintain that recording a result in a ledger is classic post-solution data output and that ledgers are recited generically. Prosecution-history caution: leaning on the ledger/attestation as the source of eligibility may effectively narrow the dependent claim's importance and could be read as conceding the independent claims lack a practical application.
Likely examiner response◐ survives — moderate
An examiner can characterize generating a cryptographic attestation of the routing decision and committing it to a distributed ledger as classic INSIGNIFICANT POST-SOLUTION recordkeeping/output — creating a record of a decision already made — under MPEP § 2106.05(g), and treat the distributed ledger as a generic recordkeeping environment that links the exception to a field of use rather than improving any technology. The examiner can note the routing decision (the asserted point of novelty) is complete before the attestation is generated, so the attestation/ledger steps do not change how the routing itself operates.
How to adjust For counsel to weigh: the 'tamper-evident constraint on the routing output' framing has some traction only if the disclosure ties the attestation/ledger to a technical function that feeds back into or constrains the routing operation, rather than being a downstream log. Confirm spec support for any technical-effect characterization. Best deployed together with argument 3's evidentiary challenge on the same claim 7 elements; if neither the integration nor the technical-effect showing is supported by the disclosure, weigh amendment to tie the ledger element to a concrete function over arguing it.
4Ordered hash-based agent-routing combination as a technological improvement (Step 2A Prong 2)
Eligibility rebuttalClaim 6Claim 9Claim 12Claim 13Rebuts: §101 rejection of claims 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20
compare the input signature to the accessed agent signatures to select one or more AI agents ... cause transmission of the input to at least one AI agent of the selected AI agent set (claim 6); comparing the input fingerprint to the accessed agent fingerprints to select one or more AI agents (claim 13)
For counsel to weigh: at Step 2A Prong Two the examiner treats the AI-agent, signature, and hash-function recitations as merely 'generally linking the use of the judicial exception to a particular environment of field of use' (office action, claim 6 Prong Two) and treats obtaining input and causing transmission as insignificant extra-solution activity. Counsel may argue instead that the claimed ordered combination — deriving a hash-based signature/fingerprint of a feature set and comparing it against agent signatures to route an input among a plurality of AI agents — is a specific technique for improving the operation of a multi-agent routing system rather than an abstract idea merely applied on a computer, in the vein of the improvement analysis at MPEP § 2106.05(a) (Enfish/McRO line). The locality-sensitive hashing (claim 12) and bitwise-distance selection (claim 9) supply a concrete, rule-based routing mechanism. This is a Prong Two path because, if the exception is integrated into a practical application, the analysis ends without reaching Step 2B.
- —Office action (claim 6, Step 2A Prong Two): 'The recitation of AI agents, input signature, and hash function amounts to generally linking the use of the judicial exception to a particular environment of field of use (See MPEP 2106.05(h)).'
- —Claim 6: 'compare the input signature to the accessed agent signatures to select one or more AI agents from the plurality of AI agents'
- —Claim 12: 'the one or more hash functions comprise locality-sensitive hash functions'
MPEP § 2106.05(a) — improvement to the functioning of a computer or to another technology integrates a judicial exception into a practical application; contrast with § 2106.05(h) field-of-use limitingEvidence needed: Confirm and pin-cite the as-filed specification passages describing the technological benefit of the hash-based routing (needed to ground the improvement narrative).
Risk The examiner will likely respond that the alleged improvement is to the abstract matching idea itself, not to computer technology, and that the specification must identify a concrete technical improvement. Counsel should confirm the as-filed specification actually describes a technical benefit (e.g., routing efficiency or accuracy) to anchor this argument. Prosecution-history caution: framing the invention around a particular technical improvement may narrow claim scope in the file wrapper.
Likely examiner response◐ survives — moderate
An examiner can respond that an improvement under MPEP § 2106.05(a) must be an improvement to TECHNOLOGY or to the FUNCTIONING OF A COMPUTER, not merely a more efficient way of performing the abstract matching/routing idea itself, and that using hashing to compare signatures and route an input is an improvement to the abstract idea (faster/better comparison) rather than to any computer capability. The examiner can also point out that Enfish/McRO-type integration requires the SPECIFICATION to describe a concrete technical improvement, and the office action's Prong Two treatment of the AI-agent/signature/hash recitations as 'generally linking the use of the judicial exception to a particular ... field of use' stands unless counsel identifies where the disclosure explains a technical (not result-level) advance.
How to adjust For counsel to weigh: this argument needs an anchor in the as-filed specification identifying a specific technical improvement (e.g., a described deficiency in prior routing approaches that the hash-based ordered combination remedies) — attorney characterization of 'a specific technique' will not by itself satisfy the improvement inquiry. Confirm what the spec actually discloses before pressing; if the disclosure supports it, cite it. Consider whether amending to recite the ordered combination more concretely strengthens the integration showing versus arguing the claims as written.
5Internally divergent treatment of claim 10 undercuts the Prong One characterization
Eligibility rebuttalClaim 10Rebuts: §101 rejection of claims 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20
wherein the feature set comprises one or more of: an entity associated with the input, an intent associated with the input, or a domain identifier associated with the input
For counsel to weigh: the office action analyzes claim 10 two different ways — first characterizing the feature-set limitation as 'extra-solution activity of gathering data' (pages 12-13), then alternatively as a mental process because 'a human can create a subset of data based on the original input set' (pages 13-15). Counsel may note that this shifting characterization reflects uncertainty about which judicial-exception grouping actually applies and may argue the limitation's 'entity/intent/domain identifier' content further specifies the feature set in a way that is not merely an abstract data-gathering step. This is a narrow point best used to reinforce the Prong One and practical-application arguments rather than as a standalone basis.
- —Office action (claim 10, first analysis): the feature-set limitation 'amounts to extra-solution activity of gathering data for use in the claimed process'
- —Office action (claim 10, second analysis): 'For example, a human can create a subset of data based on the original input set.'
MPEP § 2106.04(a) — proper identification of the recited judicial exception; § 2106.07(a) — the rejection must clearly identify the exception and additional elements
Risk The examiner may respond that presenting alternative grounds is permissible and that both grounds independently support the rejection, so an inconsistency argument alone is weak. Best deployed only as support for the stronger Prong One / practical-application positions, not on its own.
Likely examiner response⚠ fragile — the comeback likely defeats it
An examiner can respond that presenting ALTERNATIVE characterizations of a limitation (extra-solution activity in the alternative, mental process in the alternative) is a standard and proper examining practice, not evidence of 'uncertainty' that undermines the rejection — each alternative is independently sufficient, and the applicant must overcome both. The examiner can also note that claim 10 recites the feature-set content as 'one or more of' entity/intent/domain identifier, an exemplary/alternative and generically-described data selection, so it does not add a limitation that removes the claim from either grouping.
How to adjust For counsel to weigh: the premise that alternative characterizations reflect defect-inducing 'uncertainty' is a weak footing — an examiner offering alternative grounds is permitted, so attacking the pairing itself is unlikely to persuade. Also avoid treating the 'entity/intent/domain identifier' list as a defining/required limitation; it is recited in exemplary/alternative form. Keep this strictly as a reinforcing note to arguments 1 and 2 as the OA5 entry itself suggests, not as a standalone basis.